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Treating Outer Space Like a Place:
A Case for Rejecting Other Domain Analogies
Elizabeth Mendenhall
Assistant Professor
University of Rhode Island

This article considers the use of analogies in building and reforming the outer
space governance regime. It begins by reviewing the historical use of comparisons
between the ‘target’ domain of outer space and the ‘source’ domains of airspace,
the seabed, the high seas, and Antarctica. After describing how these analogies
shaped the Outer Space Treaty, a survey of contemporary literature demonstrates
that analogies continue to be used to structure thinking about outer space
activities. The central argument of the article is that analogies are a misleading
foundation for constructing a governance regime in outer space. They overlook
essential and distinct features of outer space, and misguide the actions of
policymakers by influencing interest formation and problem definition. The
second section identifies six major features of the outer space environment that
are concealed by other-domain analogies, and describes their impact on the
requirements for effective governance. The final section presents an alternative,
non-analogic representation of outer space as a place, and draws some general
conclusions about its implications for space governance.
The suddenness of the Space Age created a new set of challenges for international law, and the
rules to manage space activity were created before those challenges were fully comprehended.
Governance preceded understanding. At the opening of negotiations over the Outer Space Treaty
(OST), “most governments had little conception of space or space activity,” even though Sputnik
had entered Earth orbital space almost a decade prior.1 Before specific rules and norms for space
activities could be agreed upon, diplomats first had to establish a shared ‘locational
classification’ for outer space. Classifying outer space as an arena of activity was necessary to
allow participating governments to define the situation, identify their interests, and determine
their identities as space actors. Only then could they pursue the creation of a treaty to manage
outer space in the interests of each and all. But rather than waiting for a full appreciation and
understanding of this new domain of activity, key actors relied on analogies with other
international domains – the ocean, airspace, and Antarctica – to classify outer space. In doing so,
they misrepresented the problems of collective use of outer space, and misidentified their own
interests. The result is a dysfunctional outer space regime that persists today, unable to resolve
key questions and confront emerging issues. This article argues that analogies between space and
other planetary domains, which still enjoy significant circulation among the space community,
represent the wrong approach to outer space governance, and risk repeating the mistakes of past
regime building.
Although the use of domain analogies for outer space has been studied in great detail,
existing treatments accept and even embrace this strategy as useful or inevitable.2 Most notable
is M.J. Peterson’s work on the outer space regime, including a 1997 article in International
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Organization and her 2005 book International Regimes for the Final Frontier.3 Peterson
acknowledges that analogies can be judged based on how well they represent the actual domain;
an analogy can have more or less ‘fit’ with the material realities of outer space. But her historical
recounting demonstrates in detail that movement between analogies was mostly (if not entirely)
driven by superior political ‘fit’ with the purposes and interests of dominant actors.4 This can be
understood as a case of ‘seeing what one wants to see.’ When shifts in power among states and
interest within states occur, a new analogy with better ‘fit’ is adopted. Peterson under-plays the
point that the ‘fit’ of any given analogy with material reality changes too, as scientific
understanding comes into focus. The more we understand about actual outer space, the better we
can identify what an analogy fails to capture. In neglecting the relationship between analogies
and material reality, Peterson overlooks the way that scientific knowledge accumulation
progressively undermines the ‘fit’ of any given analogy with the material context of outer space
itself. Indeed, the increasingly accurate scientific image of outer space represents an external
standard with which other domain analogies can be usefully evaluated.
Contemporary International Relations has been moving in the other direction. Instead of
harnessing new scientific knowledge about planetary domains to evaluate the utility of social and
political representations, scholars have embraced the idea that all images of planetary space –
scientific or otherwise – are social constructions. This approach to outer space is demonstrated
by Jason Beery’s 2016 article in Political Geography.5 Beery explains the construction of outer
space as a ‘global commons’ using a “production of nature approach.” He explicitly rejects the
existence of a “fixed, pre-given, and separate” natural world in favor of an outer space that is
“socially produced” by inherently political scientific “framings” that serve the interests of
dominant actors and reinforce inequality.6 Under this view, the analog and the ‘target’ of the
analogy have equal ontological status; they are both constructed, neither is more ‘real’ than the
other. Outer space for Beery is defined by its political geography of non-appropriation, free
access, and collective benefit. He rejects the notion of an objective, material domain, thereby
relinquishing any scientific standard for evaluating the accuracy of an analogy as a
representation of the outer space domain.
This article adopts an alternative approach, one that emphasizes the special role of
scientific knowledge in producing a useable and useful ‘locational classification.’ Although this
may seem like a basic insight, the vast literature on the history of space access underemphasizes
the influence of geography and geophysics, and what we know about them and when, on space
activities.7 This article addresses two basic questions: what do analogies overlook or downplay
about the space domain, and how has their use impacted governance in outer space? I argue that
a scientific image of the outer space domain highlights its unique material features as a place, in
contrast to other-domain analogies (ocean, airspace, Antarctica), which tend to elide and obscure
important features of the outer space environment. This scientific image – which is progressively
updated in pursuit of an accurate representative of the objective material world – is more useful
for collective governance, because outer space itself places constraints on what humans can do,
how they can do it, and the consequences. In other words, the material features of space,
interacting with technologies of access, shape the practices, interests, and problems that motivate
the formation and operation of the outer space regime. When the space environment is
misunderstood and mischaracterized, so are the interests of diverse actors, and the problems
caused by shared use and free access. The stakes of accurate representation are regime
effectiveness: when interests and problems are misconceived at the time of regime formation, the
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result is international laws that inadequately serve the individual space user and larger space
community.
The first section surveys the history of applying other-domain analogies to the
international governance of outer space. During the first decades of regime formation, space
actors and international lawyers utilized a rotating set of analogies to import pre-existing legal
principles, norms, and rules. Despite decades of scientific activity in outer space, these analogies
are still relied upon for understanding what outer space is like today. The second section outlines
several ways that the use of analogies shaped the outer space regime in unproductive, and even
counterproductive, ways. International law of outer space has persisted largely unchanged since
the 1960s and 1970s, yet space science and science activities have continued to increase and
advance. This makes the mismatch between space law and space itself increasingly visible. The
third section connects the scientific, non-analogic, approach to ‘locational classification’ with the
formation of governance principles and norms to demonstrate how abandoning the use of
analogies can bring clarity to the agenda for reforming and augmenting contemporary outer
space governance.
Analogies with Outer Space
During the first decades of the Space Age, reliance on other domain analogies prevailed
in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Until the
mid-1970s, COPUOS was the “single most important source of international law relating to
space activities.”8 The committee is divided into a Scientific and Technical subcommittee and a
Legal subcommittee. The Scientific and Technical subcommittee was charged with developing
shared knowledge about space and the potentials of space activity, while the Legal subcommittee
drafted multilateral agreements for collective governance of outer space. The Scientific and
Technical subcommittee would help define and shape the agenda of the Legal subcommittee, by
identifying existing and emerging international problems in space. But the Legal subcommittee
got ahead of its counterpart, fashioning agreements before the work of the Scientific and
Technical subcommittee could really inform their content. The urgency and high stakes of Cold
War politics, and the uncertainty about who would achieve space milestones first, drove the
Soviet Union and United States – the two early space powers – to actively pursue negotiated
agreements for fear that events, activities, and the precedents they set would take the bipolar
rivalry in dangerous or disadvantageous directions.
This urgency empowered the Legal subcommittee to make key decisions about the
principles, norms, and rules of outer space law. Instead of space experts, it was international
lawyers – highly trained in analogical reasoning – that had the largest influence on early regime
formation out of COPUOS.9 Peterson describes how the use of analogies facilitated “direct
transfers of ideas” from Earth-bound international agreements to the new space regime.10 The
use of other-domain ideas obtained a kind of momentum early on, and persisted through inertia.
By the time COPUOS activity slowed down in the late 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of
technical experts on the committee had decreased in favor of diplomatic generalists, who because
of their lack of familiarity with the specific features of outer space are more likely to rely on
cognitive shortcuts like analogy. The overall result was a space regime founded on earthbound
analogies.11 Three such analogies will be considered: airspace, the ocean, and Antarctica.
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Airspace
The analogy between airspace and outer space had initial intuitive appeal, because of
their shared ascendant position and the notion that vehicles in either are ‘flying.’ The term
‘aerospace’ reflects the belief that space is a continuation of airspace, and some legal scholars at
the beginning of the Space Age proposed that the legal regime for airspace was an important
precedent for outer space. Problems associated with injury, damage, and loss from space vehicles
have been described as “identically the same…in international air law.”12 But the airspace
analogy quickly fell out of favor, and virtually no one forwarded it after 1961. Peterson argues
that the strongest explanation – a materialist explanation – is the “poorer fit with what was
known about space,” particularly the basic nature of orbital mechanics.13 The air analogy implied
that outer space should be divided into national segments treated as sovereign territories, but
“lawyers and governments alike had trouble conceiving how a country might claim sovereignty
over a vacuum whose location was constantly shifting.”14 Of course, it was not the vacuum itself
with a shifting location. Objects in any orbital trajectory, even those that appear stationary
relatively to a point on Earth, are constantly moving through different points in space. The
airspace analogy was rejected for the same basic reason physical partitioning of outer space was
abandoned: sovereign territory makes little sense in the orbital space environment.
Ocean
The analogy that most dominated the early and middle periods of space activity
compared outer space to the ocean.15 There are two different versions of this analogy: a
comparison of space itself with the high seas, and a comparison of celestial bodies (like the
Moon) with the seabed. The idea that outer space is like the high seas had intuitive appeal,
because both are vast and fluid, and contain areas of solid material. The comparison was also
readily available given the on-going negotiations over the Law of the Sea during the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. The version of this analogy with the most uptake in the international
community asserts that outer space is like the high seas, and should therefore be treated as an
open access area that can be used by everyone, but not appropriated by anyone: a res communis.
On the high seas, states are ‘flag states,’ responsible for enforcing regulations on their own
nationals, and especially on ships registered in their state. The view that outer space was like
high seas was used to define the political-geographical border between outer space (understood
as high seas) and airspace (understood as territorial seas).16 As a result of this analogy, a
significant amount of ocean governance precedent was transferred to the outer space regime,
especially obligations associated with ships and crews, such as those regarding rescue, piracy,
navigational aids, liability, and registration.17 The basic regime regarding spaceflight is modeled
on the idea of high seas’ freedoms (of access) and flag state jurisdiction.
The high seas analogy also implied a parallel between islands in the ocean, and ‘islands
in space.’18 While islands in the ocean were historically territorialized, international lawyers and
diplomats did not want celestial bodies to be characterized as res nullius and be subject to state
appropriation. Neither side of the ‘space race’ knew who would get to such places first, so both
preferred a principle of non-appropriation of celestial bodies. Because islands in the Earth’s
ocean were treated as res nullius and therefore subject to appropriation, the argument that moons
and asteroids should not be understood this way required an analogy shift. During the late 1970s,
in negotiations for the Moon Agreement, celestial bodies were compared to the non-coastal
seabed which had been declared the ‘common heritage of mankind’ in the late 1960s and early
1970s. This public ownership model reserved the mineral resources of the deep seabed for the
4

international community as a whole and included a distributional mandate. Indeed, the Moon
Agreement has many institutional features – principles, norms, and rules – drawn directly from
the provisions for the International Seabed Authority. But the Moon Agreement is ineffective,
having never been ratified by any major space actor. The outer space regime largely embeds
another analogy to address the status of celestial bodies. Instead of being treated like islands (res
nullius) or the seabed (res publica), the outer space regime treats celestial bodies as akin to
Antarctica.
Antarctica
The analogy between outer space and Antarctica became salient towards the end of
negotiations over OST, and “supplied solutions to a number of practical problems” for space
users.19 Comparisons between the southern continent and outer space already existed in the
public consciousness, as both places were understood as ‘last frontiers’ and formidable natural
obstacles to potentially lucrative exploration and development. James Spiller describes how the
outer space/Antarctica analogy was activated and made prominent as a strategic government
narrative, picked up by the popular media, and designed to “garner public support for these
strategic national initiatives and, more generally, for American Cold War internationalism.”20
The analogy with Antarctica was not chosen for its material accuracy, but because the
connection was “culturally salient,” and a way to tie past American mastery of terrestrial
frontiers to Cold War activities.21 Comparing outer space and Antarctica served strategic national
interests: both programs were motivated by national defense, military advantage, and
international prestige. Both represented grand challenges that could prove the power and
capability of a superpower and its political-economic system.22
The legacy of this analogy is apparent in both domestic and international institutions.
Spiller identifies “organizational similarities” between NASA and the U.S. Antarctica Program,
and notes that diplomats in each area continued to draw “energy and lessons” from one another
for many decades.23 On the international level, the Antarctic Treaty System – which came into
being in 1959 – was understood as a test for principles and norms to be applied to outer space.24
The Antarctic Treaty placed competing territorial claims in abeyance and reserved the continent
for peaceful, and especially scientific, purposes. It demonstrated a path for avoiding militarized
superpower conflict in a new planetary domain. Some scholars of outer space argue that the
Antarctic Treaty System served as the analogical “base model” for the outer space regime.25 Like
the Antarctic Treaty, the OST replaces the assumption of res nullius with a principle of res
communis, but with states retaining control over national objects and people.26 And like the
Antarctica Treaty, the OST also enshrines a right of peaceful scientific research and prohibits
weapons of mass destruction in orbit and on celestial bodies.
Comparison between outer space and Antarctica was not limited to historical, political,
and legal dimensions. Even though the analogy was not chosen for its material accuracy,
Spiller’s account illustrates how a material comparison was treated as valid and useful. In the
same month that OST became open for signature (January 1967), NASA officials visited
Antarctica in order to learn about maintaining human exploration in a harsh environment, on one
of the two remaining ‘last frontiers’. Because of its environment, Antarctica was considered an
“ideal testing ground” for equipment, infrastructure, and logistics that might be used in outer
space.27 It was assumed that biological life in general, and human life in particular, face the same
types of challenges in Antarctica and outer space. This analogy extended to the relationship
between the geophysical environment and technological capabilities; nuclear propulsion was
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understood to be equally revolutionary for icebreaker ships and rockets to space, such that access
to either would be cheap and easy.28
It was not the discovery of material differences that caused that comparison between
outer space and Antarctica to fade. Spiller argues that the analogy broke down during the 1970s
because the government relied on two different explanations for why lofty expectations for
exploitation of each remained unfulfilled. The common narrative about a resource bonanza
needed to be replaced. While the framing of Antarctica shifted to protection of an
environmentally fragile region, the framing of outer space remained focused on economic
advantage, but reoriented to more Earth-bound benefits like jobs, spinoff technologies, and the
uses of satellite monitoring data.29 While Antarctica needed to be kept pollution-free, outer space
was not understood to be at risk from pollution. Spiller explains that the main reason that the
Antarctic analogy did not cause a “paradigm shift” in thinking about space was that there were
“too many interests committed to a more robust program and too many people attached to the
romantic idea of the space frontier.”30 In other words, the analogy was prominent when it served
strategic national interests, and abandoned when it did not. When it was employed, it was
assumed to extend to both material and political aspects of outer space.
Analogies to the outer space domain are still widely deployed in the speeches of
policymakers, arguments of diplomats, reports of analysts, and studies of scholars. Indeed, in
2014 the journal Astropolitics published a special issue on the ‘Power of Analogies for
Advancing Space Scientific Knowledge.’31 Many such analogies are fined-grained, in that they
compare a very narrow aspect of the history of space access to another type of earthbound
activity. The special issue of Astropolitics purportedly focuses on analogies that relate to
spaceflight.32 Some of these articles introduce new analogies, such as a comparison between
spaceflight and mountaineering, and between the space program and the railroads.33 Others
unpack broad historical analogies, such as between the American western frontier and the space
program and Antarctica and outer space as places.34 Material comparisons emerge throughout,
such as the reliance on Earth geology as training for lunar geology, and the extrapolations from
Earth biology to astrobiology.35 The position articulated here does not reject such analogizing
wholesale; comparisons between government programs, popular reactions, funding models, and
other social and political realities can be illuminating. But broad material comparisons are
misleading: outer space is not a place like any other. Yet wholesale analogies between the outer
space environment and the ocean, Antarctica, and airspace still pervade contemporary thinking.
These comparisons appear fundamentally plausible and helpful, because each place is (or was)
coded as a frontier and a global commons. But the particular analogy chosen still depends on
what aspect of outer space activities is focused on, and what interests and goals are represented
by the author. A cursory review of the outer space literature reveals as much.
Comparisons with airspace and the high seas are especially common in the security
realm, and tend to structure approaches to power projection and war fighting in space.36 The high
seas analogy has been used to argue in favor of U.S. policing activities, Chinese strategies related
to ‘space control,’ and the legitimacy of space-based power and conflict more generally.37
References to the Law of the Sea Convention are especially common, and have been used to
justify private asteroid mining, to propose a legal model for utilization of lunar resources, and to
argue for the creation of national exclusion zones.38 The Antarctic analogy is forwarded by
Spiller as a way to bring space activity ‘back to Earth’ and abandon more visionary frontierism.39 Even the basic airspace analogy persists – the contrast between physical atmosphere and
abstract airspace has been used to explain how a res communis regime can coexist with
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sovereign territory in outer space.40 Each analogy is used to argue in favor of a particular
political, economic, or military action.
The initial use of analogies to understand the outer space environment in the 1960s and
1970s could be taken to indicate a lack of confidence in straightforward descriptions of this new
domain of human activity. But their continued prevalence is difficult to understand, given that
scientific knowledge of the space environment has improved markedly since the early days of the
Space Age. Indeed, it has been claimed that analogies should be used now because they were
used in the past.41 Reliance on analogies could be accounted for by the fact that very few who
discuss space activities and issues will ever actually travel there, but the same can be said for the
domains that have been the source of such analogies. The reason analogies are so common is the
same reason that they are potentially harmful: an analogy can be used to make a preferred
strategy or policy look more suited to the space environment than it really is. The next section
reviews some basic misconceptions about the space environment that persist because of reliance
on other-domain analogies.
Risks of Analogical Thinking
The basic attraction of analogies is that they make familiar the otherwise unfamiliar, and
are therefore a source of guidance for confronting new situations. They are stronger than
metaphors, which simply guide one’s orientation, in that analogies suggest that “causal or
evaluative beliefs” can be transferred from the familiar to the unfamiliar.42 Analogies therefore
serve as a vehicle for importing pre-existing legal principles, norms, and rules, but also ideas
about what is happening in space, why it is happening, and why that matters. This is an
inherently flawed strategy for constructing a political geography, because the material context of
the ocean, air, and frozen continent are not the same as the orbital space environment. If specifics
of the outer space environment and the nature of outer space activities are very different, why
should we expect other sources of international law to work for the space environment? This
section seeks to demonstrate how the three main analogies are misleading sources of information
about the space environment.
None of these analogies is useful or appropriate for fully defining the political situation in
outer space, because each source domain lacks the basic structural features of the target domain.
It might be argued that analogies, by definition, contain only partial identity with or similarity to
the target domain, and that what they do capture about reality justifies their use. The problem is
that analogies are used as an expedient to understand situations without much information, so
users are poorly suited to identify which parts of a given analogy are revealing, and which are
concealing. Indeed, when analogies are first employed, the user assumes that “the target domain
is similar in all respects to the source domain,” and use of analogies reduces the incentive to
ascertain facts about the target domain – the outer space environment.43 This entails a high
probability of misreading, misperception, and mistakes in problem definition and interest
formation. In other words, analogies provide a poor conceptual foundation for regime building.
There are six major features of the orbital space environment that other domain analogies
overlook or distort: lack of ecology, lack of fluidity, distribution of access technology, nature of
movement, infinite frontier, and existential impacts.
Lack of Ecology

7

Unlike the ocean and Antarctica, Earth orbital space and our Solar System seem to
contain no ecology – no ecosystems, no endemic life whatsoever. Even if ecosystems are
discovered on Mars or the moons of Jupiter or Saturn, they are unlikely to be active, pervasive,
and complex, compared to ecosystems on Earth. When this fact is recognized, it is usually used
to argue that the outer space environment is especially resilient and there is no one to harm.44 But
in many ways the opposite is true, because ecosystems contain properties of self-sustainability
and renewal that can moderate and regulate the impacts of human activities. Animals reproduce,
carbon can be sequestered, ice refreezes, toxins disperse, and even continental crust is renewed.
Outer space does not contain ecological sources of renewal and stabilization; it is fragile and has
limited capacity to repair itself.45 Space debris cannot be removed the same way the Chesapeake
Bay can be cleaned of pollution: there are no filter feeding bivalves in orbit. Lack of ecosystems
also means that outer space does not contain harvestable, renewable, resources that can go
extinct. The features of these types of resources give unique meaning to ‘sustainable use.’
Indeed, almost no material resources – finite or renewable – have been harvested from space.
The space resources currently used are spatial extension resources, like orbital paths and ballistic
missile trajectories. Even these are unlike sea and air lanes, in that their traversal does not entail
negative externalities for ecosystems. This creates significantly different conditions for achieving
sustainable access and use. It also represents a unique context for treaty negotiations – in the
ocean, valuable and readily accessible resources were at stake, whereas in outer space, resources
tend to be speculative or difficult to access, especially in the near term.46
Lack of Fluidity
Unlike the ocean and atmosphere, outer space is not a fluid domain in the sense of having
‘flows’ of liquid or gaseous particles.47 Water, air, and vacuum behave very differently. The
atmosphere and ocean contain winds and currents – driven by density, heat, and pressure
gradients, the Earth’s rotation, the gravitational attraction of the Moon, and other material
properties – which create patterns of dynamism and circulation within those domains. These
dynamic flows shape patterns of ecosystem productivity, distribute external inputs like pollution,
and make the borders between such domains fuzzy and fluid. The edges of the atmosphere,
ocean, and land are shaped by molecular movements and exchanges in and between each
domain, and are constantly in flux due to erosion, deposition, runoff, industrial emissions, and
sea surface exchange. The natural borders between each domain are highly porous, and for the
purposes of effective international management of environmental problems, they are largely
artificial.
In contrast, terrestrial, aerial, and maritime activities barely affect orbital space, and if
they do at all, it is through explicit and intentional launches from an earthbound domain to an
outer space one. The border with outer space is uncertain, but it is not understood to be
undergoing constant fluctuation and exchange like the coastline or sea surface. The only
exception to this is when solar flares heat the Earth’s outer atmosphere, causing it to temporarily
expand. But this dynamism is miniscule and momentary compared to other domains. Because
orbital space lacks currents and flows akin to terrestrial domains, the nature of pollution is
fundamentally different. In outer space, uncontrolled and ‘cast off’ objects in tend to spread out
evenly in a shell around the Earth. Such pollution, called ‘space debris,’ does not arrive in orbital
space unintentionally, easily, or thoughtlessly, as terrestrial pollution often enters the land,
atmosphere, or ocean.
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Distribution of Access Technology
Space technology, and the way it facilitates access and activity in space, is fundamentally
different from aerial and maritime technologies. Take the example of vehicles. ‘Ships’ are
designed for operation in all three non-terrestrial domains, but their common name is more
analogy than equivalence.48 Aircraft and watercraft – commercial, military, recreational – are
durable and reusable. In the case of boats, the technology may be very basic, and is highly
diffused across the planet. Although aircraft are more complicated and expensive, they are
usually flown for several decades before being decommissioned. In contrast, space access
technology is extremely expensive, complex, and fragile. Many space vehicles, such as rockets,
are ‘single use,’ and even reusable space vehicles require significant repair and refurbishment
between trips. Although this is not necessarily a permanent condition of space vehicle
technology, the difference in operational environments increases the barriers to robust, reusable,
and cost effective spacecraft. The material and manufacture of space vehicles is not comparable
to aircraft or watercraft; space vehicles can be weaker in some ways, for example because they
do not encounter terrestrial weather, but they need to be stronger in others, such as shielding
from radiation.
These technological differences are significant, because they result in different numbers,
distributions, and types of users. The more distinctive and expensive a technology, the fewer
actors have access to it. Distribution factors affect the political conditions for an evolving outer
space regime. Depending on the issue at hand, the small number of space users may have vastly
more or less leverage. While space actors create precedent and normalize practices, the rest
(majority) of the international community can advocate for technology transfer and profit
redistribution. Features of space access technology also impact the prospects for regulatory
strategies. For example, the question of how and whether to ‘flag’ a space vehicle via permanent
markings was an important part of the negotiations over registration.49 Flagging a boat and
painting an aircraft proved far easier than marking a vehicle that travels through the atmosphere
at extremely high speeds and temperatures. In the early 1970s, the COPUOS Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee concluded “there was no feasible way to put marks capable of
surviving the high heat of reentry on space objects and their components.”50 Although the outer
space regime borrowed the model of flag state jurisdiction from the law of the sea, outer space
vehicles could not replicate the practice of physically flagging a ship.
Movement
In a 2007 article in Astropolitics entitled “On War in Space,” Howard Kleinberg argues
that the “nature of presence” is different in outer space.51 In general, being in space means
moving at high speeds. Kleinberg points to the operation of space vehicles, which requires
extreme velocities and complex movement in three-dimensions. Vehicles in orbit circumnavigate
the entire planet, quickly and from a vantage point. Interactions between space objects are
typically done in passing because of the difficulties of syncing up velocities. The space media is
unlike other domains because it lacks “surface features, seabeds, or coastal geography to limit
motion.” Nothing in space itself can be claimed, flagged, or partitioned in a physical, static, and
permanent manner. Kleinberg uses these basic insights to reject theories of land-based warfare as
applicable to space warfare, but these features of space also demonstrate that space-based
operations are generally very different from those on Earth.
Infinite Frontier
9

The image of the frontier implies a fundamental similarity between the history of human
access to land, atmosphere, ocean, and space. In each planetary domain, humans used advancing
technology to access new resources and territorialize new spaces. The vision of outer space as
the ‘final frontier’ implies big payoffs for intrepid explorers, and a way for sovereign states to
advance their power and prestige. But the frontier analogy elides the nature of distance in outer
space. It implies that the mineral resources on celestial bodies are “accessible, no farther beyond
our grasp than the oil beneath the Beaufort” Sea.52 Many tantalizing space resources, and
especially the prospect of colonies, are out of reach of the physiological limitations of the human
body (without major technological innovation). Space travel outside the solar system would
exceed the human life span. For humans to survive in outer space, all the basic features of the
Earth environment must be recreated and maintained. Although other frontiers, like Antarctica
and the deep ocean, were rugged and challenging, those frontiers were a part of the Earth’s
planetary system and therefore similar or proximate to livable parts of the planet. Those frontiers
also have physical edges and ends which are finite and knowable. Outer space is theoretically
and practically infinite, a frontier that can never really be crossed.
Existential Impacts
Outer space contains and entails existential risks for the human species, and possibly all
life on Earth. Natural hazards from the land, ocean, and atmosphere – all planetary domains –
include volcanism, extreme weather, earthquakes, tsunamis, and the disruption of natural
systems by human activities. The outer space environment presents a different suite of natural
hazards. Outer space itself is extremely dangerous; cosmic radiation is unfiltered by atmosphere,
and cosmic debris moves at high speeds. The environmental risk of asteroids and comets extends
to the Earth as well. Collision with the Earth represents a low frequency, extremely high
magnitude threat to human survival unparalleled in the other planetary domains.
Table 1. Analogies for Outer Space.
Analogy
Ocean

Version
High seas

What it captures
Vast, fluid;
Solid islands;
Obstacles to deep access;
Coastal area (airspace)

Ocean/Land

Seabed

Vast potential mineral
wealth;
Obstacles to access

Land

Antarctica

Harsh environment;
Fragile environment;
unknown resource extent;
Distance;
Uninhabited except for few
settlements

Atmosphere

Airspace

Ascendance and ‘flying’;
Vehicle safety issues;
Vehicle registration needs

What it misses
Infinite;
Effective distance (speed of
vehicles);
Delicate and expensive
technology;
Security issues;
Space ports (leave, don’t
arrive)
Infinite;
No ecological context;
Separate mineral caches;
Abundance of helium
Infinite;
Mostly unable to partition;
Requirement of advanced
technology

Presence in regime
National registration;
International commons;
CIL principles instead of
positive rules;
Rescue obligations

Infinite;
Orbital mechanics;
Obstacles to partition

Liability rules

Moon Treaty (CHM)

International commons;
National control over
humans, vehicles, stations;
functional coordination
comes first; scientific
cooperation
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Analogies between the outer space environment and Earth’s land, ocean, or atmosphere
are misleading. Because planetary and extra-planetary domains are fundamentally different from
one other, it is not likely that regime features designed to govern one domain will be effective
when applied to another. The distinctive features of the ocean, atmosphere, Antarctica, and outer
space entail different constraints, opportunities, and motivations for regime building.53 The
actors with influence and stakes are different, as are the consequences of poor governance.
Analogies are therefore unlikely to inform durable and effective solutions to collective problems
in outer space, because they import rules, norms, and principles from regimes designed for
fundamentally different places. Spatial disorientation makes for difficult steering.
Outer Space as a Place
Analogies are intended to make new situations or things familiar and understandable, but
eventually they can be replaced with direct information about their target. The processes of
scientific knowledge production and technological advancement have continued for decades after
the construction of the outer space regime; our abilities in and understandings of the space
environment are significantly advanced relative to the 1960s. Analogies are no longer necessary
to provide a ‘locational classification’ for outer space. Scientific and technical experts generally
comprehend the basic physical features and patterns of the outer space environment. The image
of outer space described in this section reflects the basic features of their consensus.
Gravity is the dominant force shaping the material context in outer space, and especially
the areas surrounding celestial objects. Gravity shapes the outer space environment near Earth in
two major ways: by creating pathways for continuous high velocity travel around the planet, and
by making travel into space very energetically burdensome. Earth orbital space – the part of
space where the Earth’s gravitational attraction is overwhelmingly dominant – is better
understood as the outer layer of the planet, as opposed to the nearest areas of the infinite
universe. Virtually everything humans have done in space has occurred in the so-called ‘gravity
well,’ a conceptual metaphor that describes the fact that gravitational attraction falls off in a nonlinear relationship to distance. This feature of gravity means that the bulk of the energy required
to get somewhere in space is expended in the early stages of escaping Earth’s gravitational pull.
Although orbital space is vastly larger than the atmosphere in total volume, the increase
in speed made possible because of lack of friction means that distance is compressed. Outer
space travel represents a decrease in “effective distance”: even very long distances can be
traversed quickly when traveling at very high speeds 54. This speed of travel makes space
attractive for military and potentially commercial users. But high speeds are not just required in
space, they are necessary for most space activities. The supposed cornucopia of space resources
and habitats are scattered at huge distances from the Earth. Achieving a stable orbit requires
reaching orbital velocity, which depends on the mass of the object to be orbited. Orbital velocity
for the Earth is at least 17,500 miles per hour. At this velocity, an object can circumnavigate the
planet in about 90 minutes. There are several different types of orbit, or paths that a satellite can
take in its revolutions around the Earth. Orbital paths have three features: height, eccentricity
(near-circular or elliptical), and inclination (angle relative to equator). The choice of orbit
depends on the use of the satellite. Because satellites sit outside Earth’s atmosphere and above
the terrestrial environment, they have positional advantages that makes them attractive for many
different uses.
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The environment of outer space is overwhelmingly inhospitable to human life, and
creates a set of obstacles for the operation and maintenance of human technology. Outer space is
difficult to get to, be in, and return from. Because it is a vacuum, terrestrial organisms cannot
live in outer space without the assistance of advanced technology. Space-based objects
experience enormous variation in temperature, depending on their location relative to the Sun.
Outside of the protective filter of the atmosphere, radiation abounds. The ‘solar wind’ entails a
continuous and high-velocity flow of charged particles from the sun, with occasional eruptions of
intense high-energy radiation called ‘solar flares.’ An additional source of radiation is ‘cosmic
rays’ from outside the solar system. These high-energy particles travel an appreciable fraction of
the speed of light, and can do massive damage to biological tissue. Such radiation flows through
orbital space, but it is also concentrated there. The Van Allen belts are dense layers of charged
particles held around the Earth by its magnetic field, which can also do damage to humans and
human technology. This environment makes human spaceflight very difficult biologically, and
requires that everything done in space (with or without humans) include elaborate shielding. We
must do artificially what the atmosphere does naturally. This vastly increases the cost of doing
things in space, and has encouraged a shift from human to robot-based activity.
Space vehicle technology faces three major tasks: escaping gravity to reach orbital space,
maintaining structural integrity while there, and in some cases, safely returning to Earth through
the atmosphere. Each step entails significant design and materials requirements for space
vehicles. Launching requires powerful rockets and large amounts of fuel, and high launch costs
have persisted throughout the Space Age and obstructed the diffusion of access to space. The
approximate cost of putting a pound in orbit is $10,000, and roughly 85 percent of a rocket’s
weight at the launch pad is fuel.55 Because the pull of gravity is consistent, reducing launch costs
can only be achieved by decreasing the weight of payloads to minimize the amount of fuel
required, or through reusable vehicles. Operations in orbit require fuel and situational awareness,
to maintain orbits and to avoid dangerous space debris. Re-entry seems like the easy part,
because vehicles are moving in the direction gravity pulls them. But moving from frictionless
space into a friction-filled atmosphere is arduous, because friction causes a great increase in
temperature. Indeed, space vehicles become sheathed in plasma for part of re-entry. This requires
materials that can withstand extreme heat and pressure.
Celestial bodies are a large physical outer space resource. In addition to the planets that
orbit our Sun and other stars, and the moons that orbit those planets, asteroids populate the space
environment. Humans have only known about asteroids for around 200 years, and initially they
were a curiosity for astronomers. In the past three decades, however, scientists have increasingly
catalogued ‘near Earth objects’ (asteroids and comets) that may present a risk of collision with
the Earth. In these same decades, scientists first learned “the basic physical properties of
asteroids, such as rotation rate, size, shape, composition, and origin.”56 This knowledge – made
possible by innovations in electronics and computing – supported the conceptualization of
asteroids as a resource to be mined by humans.57 In comparison to other celestial bodies,
asteroids are relatively accessible, have negligible gravity, and are therefore easy to move and
easy to leave. Many of them are known to contain valuable minerals, and comets may contain
useful materials like water, methane, and ammonia.
This brief sketch of a non-analogical representation of outer space illustrates a variety of
conditions that shape outer space activities. The space environment creates durable and
predictable material trends regarding launch requirements, orbital paths, human physiological
limitations, remote sensing and communication physics, and other features of space activity. The
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space environment contains valuable resources, with spatial extension resources (like orbital
position) closer to Earth and harvestable resources (like minerals) scattered across huge
distances. The movement of celestial bodies like asteroids represents an opportunity, by making
mineral resources more accessible, and a threat, because they periodically collide with the Earth.
Movement is the norm for objects in space, and most uncontrolled objects do not slow or
accumulate, but instead are spread and multiplied by orbital dynamics. These features of outer
space activity are immune to shifts in interests or distribution of power among states. They affect
the motivations for and requirements of space access, including what resources space
technologies are designed to pursue, and the features and cost of those technologies. The outer
space material context also determines what kinds of threats exist (who they threaten and how),
including space weapons, space debris, and asteroid collision. These features of the space
environment ought to set the agenda of regime formation for outer space, but when analogies are
used, they can be downplayed or overlooked.
There are several general conclusions from the constraints and opportunities of the space
material context described above. First, the nature of space access makes the public-private
relationship something different than that envisioned by early regime builders. Major states were
concerned about sovereign appropriation of outer space in the 1960s and 1970s, but gave little
thought to the potential of uncontrolled private actors in space. The regime reflects as much:
although it explicitly rules out national territorial claims, many argue that it allows for
privatization of harvested resources. Indeed, there is an “almost comprehensive absence of
substantive provisions specifically circumscribing private space activities,” so the regime is
essentially permissive.58 Private actors have wide latitude in their choice of registry, and the state
of registry assumes ultimate liability if anything goes wrong. The shift to private space actors
relates to the material context of outer space. Access technology is advanced and expensive, but
has remained generally the same for decades. Launch and orbit is therefore accessible to anyone
with enough money. And because mineral resources are high risk and high reward, entrepreneurs
are more likely and able to pursue the massive speculative investments required, compared to
states with ample domestic responsibilities. The activities and claims of private commercial
actors are enabled by the current regime, and likely to cause new conflict in outer space
governance. The flag state model that governs the public-private relationship in space was
borrowed from the law of the sea.
Second, space objects cannot be outlawed based on their potential for harm; anything can
be a space weapon. This situation results from the fragile nature of satellites, their easy-to-target
ascendant position, and the high velocities of orbital operation. The OST prohibits weapons of
mass destruction in orbit, and attempts to outlaw space weapons generally by requiring that
‘space activities’ and ‘space objects’ must be for peaceful purposes. But the majority of space
technology is ‘dual use,’ meaning that it is difficult to distinguish objects based on their potential
for peaceful or aggressive use.59 Any object in space can damage a satellite or space vehicle by
running into it, and it would be very difficult to distinguish an accidental collision from an
intentional one. There is a problem of discrimination, where a test or targeted use may
indiscriminately harm non-target users. There is also a problem of attribution, because the
prevalence of ambient and dangerous space debris increases the risk of unintentional damage,
which may be misperceived as intentional and planned. Anything in space can be used as a
weapon, and it can be difficult to tell whether it was a weapon even after the damage occurs.
This distinctiveness issue does not exist in the ocean, atmosphere, or Antarctica, and is
overlooked or ignored by the OST regime.
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Third, the orbital environment is subject to rapid degradation. The construction of the
OST regime occurred during a period of ignorance about the geophysical-technological
interaction that creates the space debris problem. NASA scientists recognized the hazard of
natural space debris in the early 1960s, but anthropogenic debris was not an object of focused
research until the mid-1970s.60 The problem of multiplying orbital space debris was first
described by NASA scientists Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in their 1978 paper
“Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt.” The phenomenon of
‘breeding’ or multiplying debris became known as the “Kessler Syndrome.” According to
Kessler himself, “nobody believed it initially.”61 The idea of risk and limitation in orbital space
contradicted the prevailing view that space was a “limitless environment” and a “virtually
infinite sink for pollution.”62 At the time of regime formation, the high seas analogy did not
invite consideration of the risk of environmental pollution. During this period, the ocean was
conceived as a “great neutralizer, with virtually unlimited ability to absorb noxious substances.”63
But even if pollution had been a salient feature of analogies at the time, space debris is a
qualitatively different type of pollution problem because of its origins, how it spreads, and the
limited and extremely slow means by which it is naturally removed through orbital decay.
Finally, the problem of catastrophic and existential risks from asteroid collision is neither
acknowledged nor addressed by the outer space regime. None of the domain analogies drawn
upon during its formation capture the magnitude of this threat. Collision is now generally
understood to be inevitable, but this realization emerged after the core elements of the OST
regime were negotiated. Astronomers in the 1980s began to realize that near Earth objects were
numerous, and many came “uncomfortably close to Earth.”64. Humanity has a clear, definite
collective interest in preparing for the detection and diversion of collision scenarios: “An
asteroid or comet is the only natural disaster that can wipe out human society and the only
natural disaster that human society can prevent.”65 And because the development and
deployment of deflection techniques requires a long lead-time, starting now is imperative to
avoid the risk of asteroid collision.66 Continued reliance on analogies will not effectively account
for this threat. Even if it were compared with Earth-based or anthropogenic catastrophe
scenarios, the risk of asteroid collision has an essential and unique feature: unlike most natural
disasters, “cosmic hazards are unusual in that they are not spatially selective…any point on the
planet appears to have a similar chance of being struck.”67 This randomness makes the threat
seem diffuse, when it is actually very acute in the places that are struck, with reverberating
consequences that damage surrounding regions. This situation creates a special need and
challenge for regime building, one that could be overlooked when relying on other domain
analogies.
Conclusion
The central argument of this article is that using direct scientific evidence to construct a
representation of the outer space environment is superior to relying on analogical comparisons
with various planetary domains. Specifically, using an image of space that does not depend on
analogy is a better ‘locational classification’ on which to base the international law of outer
space. Because a representation from direct evidence takes longer to piece together – to collect
data and construct and test theories – resisting reliance on analogies may have the effect of
discouraging hasty conclusions about what is and will happen in space, and what needs to be
done. And when rules are made and practices normalized, they may better reflect a sober and
informed understanding about consequences for the space environment. Because domain
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analogies historically shifted with interest and power, members of the international community
built the outer space regime that seemed most advantageous to their state or bloc, as opposed to
the regime that best matched the material context of outer space. Although that ‘ship has sailed’
historically, the argument outlined here ought to inform additional regime building for space.
Scholars of different types of space activity may draw different conclusions about the
implications of outer space as a place for policymaking, international law, and grand strategy.
But the conclusions they draw about ‘what we should do’ will be better for achieving collective
goals, and avoiding shared vulnerabilities, if they are based on a realistic and scientific
representation of outer space as a place.
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